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INTRODUCTION

F

OR SEVERAL YEARS, the lower federal courts were split on
the issue of whether arbitration clauses included in investment
contracts between securities brokers and their customers were enforceable.' This issue arose frequently because these contracts
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University School of Busi-

ness. B.A., DePauw University, 1976; J.D., The University of Chicago Law
School, 1979.
1. See Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

For The Second Circuit at 5 & n.l, apps. E & F, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., v.
McMahon, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) [hereinafter

(515)
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typically call for submitting disputes to arbitration. 2 However,
lawyers representing investors have generally favored going to
court to settle disputes with brokers, while lawyers representing
brokerage firms have preferred arbitration. 3 As a result, despite
the existence of an arbitration clause, investors often insisted on a
judicial forum for the resolution of these disputes, while attorneys
for the brokers insisted that the clause be enforced and the dispute submitted to arbitration.
Section 10(b) is the major anti-fraud provision 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 and is the basis for the legal theory
used most often in securities lawsuits filed by customers against
their brokers. 6 Customers' securities fraud claims may also be alleged as predicate acts underlying a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 7 which
allows the customer to recover treble damages and attorneys' fees
which are not available under conventional securities laws. 8
Given such an enticing incentive, the "thousands of legal disputes
that ar[o]se each year between securities investors and their broPetition for Certiorari] (collecting lower federal court decisions holding both for
and against the arbitrability of claims brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO). See also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337 & nn.1-2 (1987) (collecting cases illustrating
"the conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the arbitrability of § 10(b)
and RICO claims," respectively).
2. See Note, Investor-Broker ArbitrationAgreements: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 101, 108 (1985); Wermiel, Supreme Court Orders Use of
Arbitration For Claims Under Securities-FraudLaws, Wall St. J., June 9, 1987, at 2,
col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
3. Wermiel, supra note 2.
4. Shell, Keep Broker-Client Disputes Out of Court, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1987, at
32, col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
6. Wermiel, supra note 2. See also Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators'
Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 7 & nn.22-24 (1986) ("Most federal securities claims brought against brokers by the public, however, are brought under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). The reason for this is that,
unlike the 1933 Act which is concerned with the initial distribution of securities,
the 1934 Act deals principally with post-distribution trading.") (footnotes
omitted).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
8. Shell, supra note 4. However, two bills which are expected to be introduced in Congress seek to eliminate treble damages where state or federal securities laws provide a remedy for the type of conduct on which the RICO claim
is based. The bill being developed by Rep. Frederick Boucher (D-Va.) would
deny this securities law exemption if the predicate acts alleged involved illegal
insider trading, while the version proposed by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (DOhio) would disallow the treble damages exemption if illegal investor trading is
involved or if the victim is a small investor. 3 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 7
(July 14, 1987).
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kers" 9 often included allegations of violations of RICO, the federal anti-racketeering law, as well as violations of the Securities
Act of 193310 and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Therefore, the
dispute over arbitrability came to include the arbitrability vel non
of both securities law and RICO claims, and the federal circuit
courts were hopelessly split on both issues."1
On October 6, 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States
2
granted certiorari in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon '
"to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding
the arbitrability of § 10(b) and RICO claims."' 13 OnJune 8, 1987,
the Court ruled that both types of claims are arbitrable and that
customers' agreements to arbitrate such claims must be enforced
under the explicit provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act.' 4 As
a result, investors, " 'having made the bargain to arbitrate,' will
5
be held to their bargain."'
It is unclear as yet whether the McMahon ruling will indeed
mean that "almost all" securities lawsuits will be submitted to arbitration,' 6 but the ruling will undoubtedly cause more securitiesfraud disputes to be settled by arbitration than have been in the
past.' 7 Because civil RICO specifically permits a treble damages
action for injury to business or property resulting from a pattern
of predicate criminal offenses' 8 including intentional violations of
most of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (like
Section 10(b)),' 9 civil RICO claims are often alleged as part of
such securities disputes 20 and, after McMahon, will frequently be
9. Shell, supra note 4.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77m (1982).
11. For a discussion of this conflict among the circuits, see supra note 1.
12. 107 S.Ct. 60 (1986).
13. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2336-37
(1987).
14. Id. at 2335; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (formerly
United States Arbitration Act).
15. 107 S.Ct. at 2346.
16. Wermiel, Top Court To Rule Whether Arbitrators May Settle Fraud Suits
Against Brokers, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1986, at 2, col. 3 (Midwest ed.).
17. Wermiel, supra note 2.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1976).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982) (includes within the definition of
"racketeering activity" "any offense involving ...fraud in the sale of securities
....'1).
20. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1, at 18 & n.13 (" 'Racketeering' is
becoming a basic claim in commercial disputes; ordinary customer complaints
about their securities brokers are now RICO claims."). See also AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, The Authority to Bring Private Treble-Damage Suits Under 'RICO' Should Be Reformed 2 (AICPA White Paper on Civil RICO,
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arbitrated in that context.
Several practical and legal issues confront those whose task it
is to implement the mandate of McMahon in disputes involving
both RICO and the securities laws. Among the most important of
these issues are the proper collateral estoppel effect to be given to
arbitral findings in simultaneous or subsequent litigation and the
proper order in which to conduct arbitration and litigation in this
context. Uniform rules regarding the collateral estoppel effect of
arbitration awards and the proper timing of arbitration and litigation of related claims, as well as reforms in the arbitration process
itself, must be forthcoming from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Congress if the interests of investors, the
courts, and the framers of RICO, the securities laws, and the Federal Arbitration Act are to be protected.
This article will explore the implications of the McMahon decision in securities law disputes which also involve RICO. In Section II, the history of the dispute over the arbitrability of
securities law and RICO claims will be reviewed, including a discussion of the characteristics and suitability of arbitration as an
alternative method of dispute resolution, the evolving view of the
Supreme Court of the United States regarding the propriety of
using arbitration to resolve federal statutory claims, and the
Court's unanimous holding in McMahon that RICO and 10(b)
claims are arbitrable. In Section III, questions of the proper collateral estoppel effect to be given to arbitral decisions in simultaneous or subsequent litigation of related but non-arbitrable
securities law claims and the proper ordering of these arbitration
and litigation proceedings will be addressed. Finally, several recommendations designed to deal with the collateral estoppel and
ordering issues raised in Section III will be presented.
II.
A.

THE HISTORY OF THE ARBITRABILITY DISPUTE

Arbitration as an Alternative Method of Dispute Resolution

Arbitration is a process of dispute resolution in which an impartial trier of fact, or arbitrator, evaluates evidence and renders
an opinion pursuant to general principles of law, culminating in a
July 31, 1985), reprinted in Oversight On Civil RICO Suits: Hearings On Oversight On
Civil RICO Suits Brought Under 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) Before the Senate Committee On the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 251, 255 (1985) ("RICO claims are now added as
a matter of course in virtually all cases challenging securities transactions.").
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decision which will be final and binding on the parties. 2 1 Unlike
judicial litigation, arbitration permits the parties to select their
own trier of fact, to specify the rules of evidence and procedure to
be observed during the arbitration process, to impose limitations
on the arbitrator's power, and to determine the substantive legal
22
rules which will govern the resolution of the dispute.
As an alternative method of dispute resolution, arbitration
has the potential to reduce court congestion, reduce the expense
and delay of litigation, and improve compliance with decisions
designed to resolve disputes. 2" Parties to an arbitration perceive
the dispute resolution procedure to be fairer than do parties to
litigation. This results in an increased willingness on the part of
these parties to settle their disputes or, in the alternative, to abide
by an arbitration decision if one is made. Parties to arbitration
also cite the greater expertise of the "judges" and the more expe24
ditious procedures as advantages of arbitration over litigation.
The arbitrator who settles the dispute is selected by the parties themselves for his subject-matter expertise in the area of the
dispute, not for his legal expertise. In fact, the arbitrator is not
required to have any legal knowledge or training whatsoever. 2 5
The arbitrator need not justify or explain his decision, need not
write any type of opinion beyond the resolution of the dispute,
and is not bound to adhere to the principle of stare decisis.2 6 Judicial review of an arbitration award is therefore severely limited, as
are the grounds for reversal of an arbitrator's decision. An arbitrator's determination is binding on the parties and usually will
not be overruled unless a court finds that he has abused his discretion or completely disregarded the contractual agreement
which is the subject of the dispute. Even an incorrect application
27
of the law will usually not be grounds for disputing an award.
Arbitration forums and procedures have become increasingly
21. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (4th ed.
1985).
22. Id. at 7-9.
23. Mobilia, Offensive Use of CollateralEstoppel Arising Out of Non-Judicial Proceedings, 50 ALB. L. REV. 305 (1986).
24. Id. at 307-08; Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7
JUST. Sys. J. 420, 426 (1982).
25. Mobilia, supra note 23, at 309.
26. Id. at 309 & n.28.
27. Id. at 309-10. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 21. See
also Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 552-54 & nn.34-40; Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2353-55 & nn.14-18 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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accessible and sophisticated, and the rules and procedures which
govern arbitration have been refined with an eye to ensuring fair
results. In addition, arbitration forums are more readily available
to litigants. The American Arbitration Association has twenty-six
branch offices in the major American cities. 28 Similarly, the NYSE
has standing panels in thirty-five cities and the NASD in fifty cities. Each will conduct hearings elsewhere upon agreement of the
parties.29
Extensive nationwide experience with arbitration in the last
thirty-five years has demonstrated that it is a fair, efficient, and
effective means to resolve commercial disputes. In 1950, the
American Arbitration Association had a total of approximately
1750 arbitrations, fewer than 500 of which were commercial. In
1985 the total number of arbitrations had increased more than
twenty-five times to 45,000, over 8,000 of which were commercial. 30 Moreover, the virtues and efficacy of arbitration have been
3t
widely recognized in recent years by courts and commentators.
B.

The Use of Arbitration To Resolve Securities Disputes

Arbitration is frequently used to settle securities-law disputes. 32 For the year ending March 31, 1984, more than 3000
securities and commodities cases were filed in federal district
court.3 3 During roughly the same period, however, almost 2000
securities cases were arbitrated under the auspices of the various
self-regulatory organizations (SROs). 34 If one included the arbitration of securities disputes before non-SRO tribunals, such as
the New York Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Department or
the American Arbitration Association, the number would be even
28. Meyerowitz, The ArbitrationAlternative, 71 A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (1985); American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rule 11, reprinted in R.
COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED To KNow 86 (2d ed. 1982)
(fixing locale of arbitration).
29. Meyerowitz, supra note 28, at 79.
30. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 & n.7 (1985); Furnish, Commercial ArbitrationAgreements
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 317-18 & n.l (1979).
31. See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982);
Meyerowitz, supra note 28.
32. Fletcher, PrivatizingSecurities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 394 (1987).
33. Id. See Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 279 & n.5 (1984).
34. Katsoris, supra note 33, at 280 n.7 (showing that in 1983, 1,731 cases
were submitted to various SROs for arbitration).
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higher.3 5 Moreover, the number of cases submitted to arbitration
36
before the SROs has been increasing annually.
The arbitration practices employed in securities disputes today manifest "a substantially more sophisticated and regulated
system than was in place in 1953."37 The 1975 amendments to
the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Exchange Act 38 gave the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) authority to oversee
the rules and procedures prescribed by the self-regulatory organizations, and to ensure that these procedures are adequate to enforce the rights of investors against SRO-member brokerage
firms.3 9 The regulated organizations include the national securi-

ties exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (NASD).
In 1977, the SEC exercised its authority under the 1975
amendments by promoting the formation of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, which drafted the Uniform Code
of Arbitration. 40 The Uniform Code, which has been adopted by
virtually all SROs, 4 1 provides in most cases for arbitration panels
of not less than three or more than five members "at least a majority of which shall not be from the securities industry, unless the
public customer requests a panel consisting of at least a majority
from the securities industry."'4 2 Arbitration under the Uniform
Code is "a structured forum subject to a clear set of rules" which
the SEC has expressly approved and found to be in the public
interest and in furtherance of just and equitable principles of
trade. 4 3 In fact, the SEC retains jurisdiction to correct any perceived abuses or unfairness in the arbitration rules pursuant to
35. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 395 & n. 11.
36. In 1980, 830 cases were submitted for arbitration before the SROs; in
1981, 1042; in 1982, 1340; and in 1983, 1731. Id. at 395 n.12; Katsoris, supra
note 33, at 280 n.7.
37. Brown, Shell, & Tyson, Arbitration of Customer-BrokerDisputes Arising Under
the FederalSecurities Laws and RICO, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 13-14 (1987) [hereinafter
Brown].
38. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 19, 89 Stat.
97, 146-55 (1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1934)).
39. Brown, supra note 37, at 14 & n.38 ("Pursuant to the 1975 amendments,
the SEC now has authority over all SRO rules, including those of the exchanges."). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)-(c) (1982). See also Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2340 (1987).
40. Brown, supra note 37, at 14; see also 42 Fed. Reg. 23, 892 (1977); Katsoris, supra note 33, at 283-84.
41. Brown, supra note 37, at 14.
42. Uniform Code of Arbitration Section 8(a)(1), reprinted in SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, FIFrH REPORT (Exhibit C) (April 1986).
43. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1, at n.5.
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Section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 44 Furthermore, arbitrators are bound to follow the law in adjudicating Section 10(b) claims.4 5 Manifest disregard of the law is one ground
46
to vacate an arbitration award in the securities law context.
Arbitration practice pursuant to the Uniform Code of Arbitration seems to be operating impartially. In 1985, the Securities
Industry Conference on Arbitration reported resolution of some
960 cases, over half of which resulted in awards for the claimant.
There is evidence suggesting that these awards averaged approximately one-half of the amount demanded in the initial filing. 4 7
C.

The Evolving JudicialAttitude Toward Arbitration

Although Congress explicitly sanctioned arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution in 1925, the courts were
slow to enforce arbitration clauses. The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) 4 8 governs agreements to arbitrate most commercial disputes, and states in relevant part:
A written provision in ...a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
49
the revocation of any contract.
This legislation represented the first break from the English
tradition in which the judiciary refused to enforce arbitration
agreements on the basis that such agreements impinged upon the
courts' jurisdiction, 50 and was designed to allow parties to avoid
the costliness and delays of litigation "and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." 5 1 Even
though American courts criticized the anti-arbitration attitude as
illogical and unjust, the notion was considered too deeply rooted
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1982).
45. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
46. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, [Current] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 92,781 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1986) (Weinfeld, J.).
47. Brown, supra note 37, at 14-15 & n.41.
48. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (formerly United States Arbitration Act).
49. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added).
50. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 & n.4 (1974).
51. Id. at 510-11 & n.4 and authorities cited therein.
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to be overruled without legislative action. 5 2
By its terms, the Federal Arbitration Act leaves no place for
the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates
that district courts "shall" direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been
signed. 5 3 Thus, the FAA requires that arbitration agreements be
enforced absent a ground for revocation of the contractual agree54
ment itself.
However, even after the FAA was enacted, the courts frequently found arbitration to be an unsatisfactory method of dispute resolution, and generally refused to enforce arbitration
agreements in the areas of securities, antitrust, bankruptcy, and
RICO disputes. 55 The courts advanced several reasons for rejecting arbitration in these areas, but the most common rationale
originated with' the United States Supreme Court itself.
In 1953, in Wilko v. Swan, 56 the Supreme Court was forced to
decide whether a customer who had executed a written agreement that any future controversy between him and his broker
would be resolved by arbitration had thereby waived his statutory
right to sue the broker in court under Section 12(2) 5 7 of the Securities Act of 1933. The 1933 Act specifies that any agreement
waiving compliance with one of its provisions is void, 58 while the
FAA states that written arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable and that a court must stay the trial of any action if the
issue involved is referable to arbitration under such an agreement. 59 In deciding Wilko, the Court was confronted with "[t]wo
policies, not easily reconcilable: '' 60 the desire to provide "an opportunity generally to secure prompt, economical and adequate
52. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 (1985) (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)).
53. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1982); see also Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218.
54. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218.
55. See, e.g., S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), order certifiedfor interlocutoryappeal, 579 F. Supp. 1049
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), appealed and aff'd on other grounds, 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding arbitration clauses unenforceable in areas of antitrust, bankruptcy,
10(b), and RICO claims respectively); Applied Digital Technology v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d
432 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
56. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
59. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1982).
60. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
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solution of controversies ' 61 on the one hand, and the desire to
62
protect the rights of investors on the other.
The Court resolved the conflict in favor of the 1933 Securities Act's policy of protecting investors vis-a-vis brokers, ruling
that the statutory right to select a judicial forum was the kind of
" 'provision' " that Congress "must have intended" to be
nonwaivable, and that the customer's agreement to arbitrate future disputes arising under the Securities Act was therefore
void. 63 The Court's Wilko decision seemed to bode ill for the arbitral resolution of disputes, especially those involving statutory
claims such as RICO and the federal securities laws.
However, in the last thirteen years, culminating in McMahon,
the Supreme Court of the United States has rendered six decisions that have created a favorable climate for commercial arbitration-including
the arbitration of statutory rights-by
dramatically expanding the scope and applicability of the FAA.6
This series of decisions establishes a strong federal policy favoring arbitration and makes clear that the FAA (1) requires arbitration of statutory disputes in both international and domestic
contexts, (2) creates a body of substantive federal law that is preemptive and binding on the states, (3) mandates arbitration of
65
pendent arbitrable state law claims in federal statutory cases,
and (4) mandates the arbitration of federal statutory claims absent a clear Congressional intent to the contrary.
The first case in the series is Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co. ,66
which was decided in 1974. In Scherk, a U.S. company sued a German citizen for fraud in connection with the sale of the German's
business, alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The contract for the sale of the business contained a clause calling for arbitration before the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France, and for the application
of Illinois law. The U.S. company brought suit in federal court,
hoping to defeat the arbitration clause pursuant to the Supreme
Court's Wilko decision.
The Court, despite Wilko, ruled that the arbitration clause
should be enforced pursuant to the explicit provisions of the
61. Id.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 434-37.
Brown, supra note 37, at 7.
Id.

66. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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FAA. The Court's decision was primarily based on international
law considerations:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum
in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is . . . an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction.... A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an
international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure
67
tactical litigation advantages.
Therefore, the Court concluded that "[t]he exception to the clear
provisions of the Arbitration Act carved out by Wilko is simply
inapposite to a case such as the one before us." 68 The Court also
intimated in Scherk that perhaps Wilko should not be extended to
prohibit the arbitration of claims made under Section 12(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, noting that "[a]t the outset, a
colorable argument could be made that even the semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control the case before us." 69
In the decisions following Scherk, the Court continued to reaffirm the applicability of the FAA and to disapprove of the judiciary's past hostility to the use of arbitration to settle disputes. In
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. ,70 the
Court ruled that a federal court was required by the FAA to compel arbitration even when a prior suit was pending in a state court
for a declaratory judgment that the dispute was not subject to arbitration. The Court asserted that the FAA established a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements which was to be interpreted as a matter of substantive federal law, and that "[t]he
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration ....,71
The Court followed through on the broad language of Moses
67. Id. at 516-17.

68. Id. at 517.
69. Id. at 513. For an analysis of this "colorable argument," see Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2346-47 & nn.l-2 and authorities cited therein (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

70. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
71. Id. at 24-25.
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H. Cone during its next term. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,72 the
Court struck down a provision in a state franchise statute which
prohibited the arbitration of claims filed under the statute on the
ground that the FAA preempted any such attempt by a state to
limit arbitration. The Court asserted that "[i]n enacting § 2 of
the federal Act [Federal Arbitration Act], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration....
Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.1 73 The Court also declared that "Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements. ' 74 Therefore, only
Congress, not the state legislatures, has the power to create ex75
ceptions to the federal rule requiring the arbitration of disputes.
In the following year, the Court enunciated its test for determining when Congress has in fact created an exception to the
FAA. The case arose in the context of an alleged violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc. ,76 in alleging that a Japanese manufacturer had violated the Sherman Act, a Puerto Rican car dealer objected to the
enforcement of a contractual arbitration clause on the basis of a
widely adopted exception to the FAA for domestic antitrust
claims which the Second Circuit had developed in 1968 in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. JP. Maguire & Co..77 The Supreme
Court refused to apply American Safety to the case at bar and, as in
Scherk, held that the international context required enforcement
of the parties' arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the Court
noted that statutory claims such as those under the Sherman Act
were not presumptively exempt from arbitration under the FAA,
and fashioned a broad test for precisely when a statutory right
might be exempted from the policies of the FAA:
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the
Federal Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to
construe the scope of arbitration agreements covered by
the Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 16.
Id.; see also Brown, supra note 37, at 8.
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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some other statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable ....
We must assume
that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against
waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will
be deducible from text or legislative history .... Having
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held
to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
78
rights at issue.
In applying this federal policy in favor of arbitration during
the same term, the Court went so far as to require district courts
to compel arbitration of arbitrable pendent state law claims which
are intertwined with nonarbitrable federal claims, "even where
the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums." 7 9 In Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd,80 the Court addressed the issue whether, in cases involving a single transaction raising both nonarbitrable federal
claims and arbitrable state common-law claims, all of the claims
could be tried together in a' federal court for reasons of judicial
economy. Up to that time, a number of circuit courts of appeal
had adopted a " 'doctrine of intertwining,' " under which district
courts were free to consolidate for trial arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arising from a single set of facts. 8 ' The Court struck
down that doctrine, holding that the FAA requires arbitration of
all arbitrable claims no matter what the effect on judicial economy: "The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act
[FAA] was to enforce private agreements into which parties had
entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation,
at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another fed82
eral statute."
Full recognition and implementation of this strong federal
policy in favor of arbitration is made most clearly in the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc.
78. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627-28.
79. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).

80. Id.
81. Id. at 216-17.

82. Id. at 221.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 515

v. McMahon.83 Between 1980 and 1982, the McMahons were customers of Shearson. Two customer agreements signed by Julia
McMahon provided for arbitration of any controversy relating to
the accounts the McMahons maintained with Shearson. In October 1984, the McMahons filed a complaint against Shearson and
the broker who had handled their accounts, alleging that the broker had violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5 by engaging in fraudulent and excessive trading on their accounts ("churning") and by making false
statements and omitting material facts from the advice given to
them. They also alleged a violation of RICO, and included state
84
law claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duties.
Relying on the customer agreements, Shearson moved to
compel arbitration of the McMahons' claims pursuant to Section
3 of the FAA. The District Court found that the McMahons' 10(b)
claims were arbitrable under the terms of the customer agreement, and that their state law claims were also arbitrable. It held,
however, that the McMahons' RICO claim was not arbitrable. 8 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court on the state law and RICO claims, but it
reversed on the Exchange Act claims. 86 The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari8 7 to resolve the conflict
among the Courts of Appeals regarding the arbitrability of Section 10(b) and RICO claims. 8 8
The Supreme Court held that both Section 10(b) and RICO
claims are arbitrable and reversed and remanded the Second Circuit's decision.8 9 Writing for the majority, 90 Justice O'Connor
83. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
84. Id. at 2334.
85. McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 387-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 97-98 (2d Cir.
1986).
87. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
88. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2336-37
(1987).
89. Id. at 2334-35.
90. Justices Rehnquist, White, Powell, and Scalia joined in Justice
O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 2335. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and
Stevens joined in the Court's decision with respect to the arbitrability of RICO
claims but not in the Court's decision with respect to the arbitrability of Section
10(b) claims. Id. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. Justice
Stevens also filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id.
Thus, the Court ruled 5-4 that Section 10(b) claims are arbitrable, and 9-0 that
RICO claims are arbitrable. Id.
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noted at the outset that the FAA was the proper starting point for
answering the questions raised in the case, 91 and observed that
the Act "establishes a 'federal policy favoring arbitration' 9 2 requiring that 'we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.' "93
She immediately disposed of the argument that this policy is less
compelling when statutes are involved, stating that:
[t]his duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a
claim founded on statutory rights. As we observed in
[Mitsubishi]. . ., 'we are well past the time when judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunals' should inhibit enforcement of the Act " 'in controversies based on statutes' "
[quoting Wilko].... The Arbitration Act, standing alone,
therefore mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory directive, the
Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional command. The burden is on the party
opposing arbitration, however, to show that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue. If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver
of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent
'will be deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative
history,' or from an inherent conflict between arbitration
94
and the statute's underlying purposes.
Therefore, it followed that in order "[t]o defeat application of the
Arbitration Act," 9 5 the McMahons would have to "demonstrate
that Congress intended to make an exception to the Arbitration
Act for claims arising under RICO and the Exchange Act, an intention discernible from the text, history, or purposes of the statute." 9 6 This, the Court found, the McMahons had not done.
First, the Court had to contend with its previous holding in
Wilko v. Swan 9 7 that claims arising under Section 12(2) of the Se91. 107 S. Ct. at 2337.
92. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
93. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221
(1985)).
94. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-28, 632-37 (1985)).
95. Id. at 2338.
96. Id.
97. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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curities Act of 1933 are not arbitrable. The McMahons argued
that claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are
nonarbitrable for an analogous reason,9 8 and the Supreme Court
either had to agree with them and extend Wilko to Exchange Act
claims, overrule Wilko expressly, distinguish the 1933 Act from
the 1934 Act for arbitrability purposes, or drastically limit the
Wilko holding to its facts. The Court chose the last option.
Observing that "[i]t is difficult to reconcile Wilko's mistrust of
the arbitral process with this Court's subsequent decisions involving the Arbitration Act," 99 Justice O'Connor asserted that "Wilko
must be understood ... as holding that the plaintiff's waiver of
the 'right to select the judicial forum' . . . was unenforceable only
because arbitration was judged inadequate to enforce the statutory rights created by § 12(2) [of the Securities Act of 1933]."100
However, observed Justice O'Connor, that judgment is no longer
valid:
[T]he mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for
the Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the
assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that
time. This is especially so in light of the intervening
changes in the regulatory structure of the securities laws.
Even if Wilko's assumptions regarding arbitration were
valid at the time Wilko was decided, most certainly they
do not hold true today for arbitration procedures subject
to the SEC's oversight authority. 0 1
Therefore, the Court "refuse[d] to extend Wilko's reasoning to
the Exchange Act in light of these intervening regulatory developments," at the same time refusing to explicitly overrule
Wilko. 0 2 "Wilko," stated Justice O'Connor, "must be read as barring waiver of a judicial forum only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue." 10 3 This drastic
limitation on the precedential value of Wilko, based on the notion
that times-and arbitration procedures-have changed, seriously
98. 107 S. Ct. at 2338.
99. Id. at 2340 (citing as examples Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984);
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
100. Id. at 2338.
101. Id. at 2341.
102. Id. at 2342.
103. Id. at 2339.
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calls into question the continuing vitality of the Wilko exception to
the FAA for claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933.
D.

McMahon on the Arbitrability of RICO Claims

The McMahon Court was unanimous in its ruling that RICO
claims are arbitrable and that predispute agreements to arbitrate
10 4
them are therefore enforceable under the terms of the FAA.
Using its newly enunciated technique of inspecting the statute's
text, legislative history, and purposes for evidence that Congress
intended to' make an exception to the Arbitration Act for claims
arising under RICO, 10 5 the Court found "nothing in the text of
the RICO statute that even arguably evinces congressional intent
to exclude civil RICO claims from the dictates of the Arbitration
Act," and found that "[t]his silence in the text is matched by si10 6
lence in the statute's legislative history."'
The Court also found no conflict between arbitration and
RICO's underlying purposes. The Court had already addressed
many of the public policy arguments made by the McMahons in
this regard in its opinion in MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth Inc., 107 and it did not find these assertions to be any
more persuasive in the case at bar than it had in the previous case.
The Court reiterated that neither potential complexity, the overlap between RICO's civil and criminal provisions, nor the private
policing function of civil RICO make arbitration of civil RICO
claims inappropriate.' 08 Therefore, the Court concluded that
"there is no inherent conflict between arbitration and the purposes underlying § 1964(c) [civil RICO]," and that "nothing in
RICO's text or legislative history otherwise demonstrates congressional intent to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for
RICO claims."' 10 9 Hence, RICO claims were found to be arbitrable under the terms of the Arbitration Act." 0
104. Id. at 2345-46.

105. Id. at 2338.
106. Id. at 2343-44.
107. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
108. 107 S. Ct. at 2345-46.

109. Id.
110. ld. at 2346.
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IMPLEMENTING MCMAHON IN CASES INVOLVING

Rico

AND

THE SECURITIES LAWS: COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE

PROBLEM OF ORDERING

A.

Concerns About Collateral Estoppel andJudicial Economy

The Supreme Court's ruling in McMahon, that claims arising
under RICO and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 are arbitrable and that predispute agreements to arbitrate
such claims must be enforced, forces the courts, the Congress,
and the SEC to face two issues which they have never directly addressed before: the proper collateral estoppel effect to be given
to arbitral decisions in simultaneous or subsequent litigation of
securities law disputes, and the proper ordering of arbitration of
the arbitrable claims and litigation of the nonarbitrable claims in
such disputes.

Problems arise when a plaintiff includes in his complaint
claims as to which arbitration can be compelled and claims as to
which, under Wilko, arbitration cannot be compelled (principally,
claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933). I 11 The court can
either permit the arbitration and court case to proceed simultaneously, or it can rule that one should conclude before the other
commences. If the court decides that one proceeding should end
before the other begins, it has the additional task of deciding the
l 2
proper order of the proceedings."
Several issues must be addressed as part of this ordering

problem. The most important is the degree to which collateral
estoppel' 3 will affect the proceeding which goes last. If, for example, an arbitration proceeding results in a resolution of issues
that then precludes retrying those issues in federal court, the
111. Arguably, the majority's comments in McMahon that the mistrust of
arbitration which formed the basis for the Wilko decision is no longer defensible,
and that therefore "Wilko must be read as barring waiver of a judicial forum only
where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue," authorize courts to rule that Wilko no longer bars arbitration of claims brought
under the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 2339, 2341. This would obviate many
ordering problems in securities disputes, at least those in which the only claims
included were claims made under RICO, the 1933 Act, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In the alternative, the Wilko exception could be legislatively
abolished in order to avoid the problems caused when arbitrable federal securities claims are pleaded with nonarbitrable claims. See Katsoris, supra note 33, at
306 & n.206. If either of these eventualities comes to pass, much of the succeeding discussion about ordering will become moot.

112. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 431-32.
113. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which
has already been decided in a prior action. For an explanation of this concept,
see infra notes 150-64 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff's right to a federal judicial forum becomes meaningless.
On the other hand, if resolution of certain issues in federal court
precludes raising those issues again in arbitration, then the right
to arbitration becomes meaningless. In either event, the proceeding which takes place last is inevitably short-changed in significance." 4 Yet, if the decision of the first forum to render an
opinion has no preclusive effect whatsoever on the other forum,
the arbitration and litigation proceedings will be totally unconnected. This modus operandi will likely "complicate, delay, and
often thwart justice through conflicting and contradictory
results."'15
Preventing duplicative proceedings which seek twice to answer the same legal questions is another goal of proper ordering." 6 Now that McMahon has made clear that Wilko does not
apply to claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, more claims will surely be forced into arbitration and some
duplication avoided since most federal securities claims arise
under the 1934 Act.' ' 7 However, although the McMahon ruling
that these claims are arbitrable eliminates one reason for the
maintenance of duplicative proceedings in separate forums, Wilko
still requires that claims brought under the 1933 Act be litigated.
Moreover, the Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd 18 requires federal courts to sever arbitrable claims from
nonarbitrable ones and compel the arbitration of the arbitrable
claims.
When a court severs similar claims, the arbitration proceeding and the federal trial cover similar ground, determining similar
questions of fact. Under Byrd, a court cannot stay arbitration until
the litigation of nonarbitrable federal claims is complete.' '9 Such
parallel proceedings defeat the federal policy of pendent jurisdiction, which promotes judicial economy by resolving related state,
non-arbitrable federal, and arbitrable federal issues in a single forum. 120 Thus, the potential for duplication of effort in parallel
114. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 432.
115. Katsoris, supra note 6, at 11.
116. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 434-35 & nn.269-72.
117. Katsoris, supra note 6, at 11 & n.45.
118. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 8082 and accompanying text.
119. 470 U.S. at 223.
120. Katsoris, supra note 33, at 305 n.201; Krause, Securities Litigation: The
Unsolved Problem of Predispute ArbitrationAgreements for Pendent Claims, 29 DEPAUL L.
REV. 693, 704 (1980); Comment, Enforcing Arbitration of Federal Securities Law
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and duplicative proceedings remains even after McMahon.121
B. JudicialEconomy and Mixed Claims: Intertwining
v. "Sever and Stay"
The Supreme Court's decisions in both Wilko and Byrd have
contributed to the problem of inefficiency in disposing of related
arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims. Another commentator has
ably characterized the turmoil which followed those decisions:
The central problem presented in Byrd arose countless

t 1221
times in the lower courts after Wilko was decided
The problem arose when a party combined clearly arbitrable state common-law or statutory claims 12 3 with
nonarbitrable federal claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Faced with this situation, the district
courts had three possible choices: send the entire case
to arbitration, send none of the case to arbitration, or
24
send part of the case to arbitration.'
The most obvious solution would be to sever the arbitrable claims from the nonarbitrable claims and stay
the court proceedings on the arbitrable claims pending
arbitration. Such a "sever and stay" approach found
126
favor with many courts [125 1 and commentators, I
largely because the approach heeded the Wilko doctrine
while enforcing the parties' contract, as required by the
FAA, to the greatest extent possible.1 271 Other courts,
Claims. The Effect of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV.
335, 353 & nn.99-100 (1987).
121. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1, at 17 n.12; Comment, supra
note 120, at 353 & nn.97-100.
122. See infra notes 125-26 & 128-29.
123. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 414 & n.150.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 415 n.151; see also Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d
314, 320-21 (6th Cir. 1983); Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 64346 (7th Cir. 1981); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1123, 1124 (E.D.
Mo. 1985); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 567-68 (N.D. Cal. 1984);
S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566, 576
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 745 F.2d 190, 196-97 (2d Cir. 1984); Macchiavelli v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 31 (E.D. Cal. 1974); Davend Corp. v. Michael,
[1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,540 at 99,729
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
126. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 415 n.152; see also, Bell & Fitzgerald,
Mixed Arbitrable/NonarbitrableDisputes, 16 REV. SEC. REG. 849, 853 (1983); Note,
The Severability of Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Securities Claims, 41 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1165, 1184-86 (1984).
127. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 415.
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expressing a variety of concerns, adopted the "intertwining doctrine," holding that when arbitrable claims are intimately related factually to the nonarbitrable claims, the
entire intertwined package should be adjudicated in federal court without arbitration. 1 2 8 1 Still others acknowledged the appropriateness of the sever and stay
approach but, after ordering certain claims to arbitration, enjoined the arbitration proceedings pending reso129 "
lution of the federal court action. ]
In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, t3 0 the Supreme Court rejected the intertwining doctrine in favor of the sever and stay approach, and admonished courts not to stay or enjoin arbitration
pending the outcome of the federal court action. 13 The Court
unanimously held that the intertwining doctrine was inconsistent
32
with the FAA.'
The Court's decision two years earlier in Moses H. Cone Memo128. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 415 n.153; see also, Belke v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (11 th Cir. 1982)
(claims were inextricably intertwined); Sawyer v. Raymond, James & Assocs.,
642 F.2d 791, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1981) (bifurcation would lead to duplicate review
of same facts); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 335-36 (5th Cir.
1981) (claims were for single legal wrong); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540,
543 (5th Cir. 1976) (claims were inextricably intertwined), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
824 (1977); Wise v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 596 F. Supp. 1391, 1397-98 (D. Del.
1984) (all claims should be heard in one proceeding to effectuate purposes of
FAA); Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 584-85
(E.D. Cal. 1982) (bifurcation would frustrate FAA purpose to make dispute resolution faster and simpler); Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598, 600 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (due to collateral estoppel effect of arbitration, allowing arbitration of issues involved in nonarbitrable 1934 Act claims would frustrate exclusive jurisdiction provisions of 1934 Act); Frogner v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 99,504, at
96,927 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1983) (bifurcation would result in duplication of
proof); Seymour v. Bache & Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,402, at 99,058 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1976) (judicial economy requires
litigation of entire matter in one forum).
129. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 414-15 (footnotes omitted); see also Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 833-36 (7th
Cir. 1977); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Sennett v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,378, at 97,502-03 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 1980); Peacock v. Oppenheimer
& Co., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,201, at 96,58687 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1979).
130. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). For a discussion of Dean Witter Reynolds, see supra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
132. 470 U.S. at 217.
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rial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 133 foreshadowed the
Court's holding on the issue of intertwining in Byrd. In Moses H.
Cone, the Court insisted that the FAA "requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement."' 1 34 The Byrd Court relied heavily on Moses H. Cone in
rejecting the intertwining doctrine. 1 35 The Court accepted instead the reasoning of those courts adopting the sever and stay
approach,136 stating that the FAA requires the arbitration of pendent claims even if that would result in inefficiencies due to the
1 37
maintenance of proceedings in two forums.
The death of the intertwining doctrine also marked the end
of the practice of enjoining the arbitration of severed claims
pending the outcome of the federal court suit.13 8 The Byrd Court
undercut the judicial economy justification for adopting such an
approach, explicitly rejecting the notion that considerations ofjudicial economy are a legitimate reason for forestalling arbitration. 13 9 Under Byrd, therefore, a court presented with arbitrable
state claims and nonarbitrable federal claims must, on the motion
of a party, sever and stay the arbitrable claims and direct that arbi140
tration proceed without delay.
This approach is fraught with difficulty. Because federal
courts and arbitrators follow different rules of procedure, evidence, and law, these separate proceedings may produce conflicting conclusions even though both actions arose out of the same
securities transaction. 14 1 The principle of automatic bifurca133. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). For a discussion of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
134. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit had previously expressed the same sentiment in 1981 in Dickinson v. Heinold Sec. Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981) ("A requirement to arbitrate
may, in a particular instance, result in some duplication of effort, but this prospect cannot vitiate the agreement of the parties.").
135. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220-21.
136. See supra notes 125 & 129 and accompanying text.
137. 470 U.S. at 220-21.
138. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
139. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220.
140. Some courts have stayed litigation of the nonarbitrable federal claims
pending the outcome of the arbitration. See, e.g., Webb v. R. Rowland & Co.,
613 F. Supp. 1123, 1124 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,328,
at 92,175 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 1985). The wisdom and propriety of this and
other ordering techniques are discussed infra notes 218-30 and accompanying
text.
141. Comment, supra note 120, at 353 n.101.
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tion 4 2 therefore makes possible the disposition of arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims separately and simultaneously, 143 putting the
judge and the arbitrator "on a collision course."' 14 4 Such a state
of affairs creates especially severe headaches for the arbitrator,
who is usually not a lawyer.14 5 Moreover, at a time in our judicial
history when the courts are already overburdened, creating even
14 6
more delay and duplication is unwise.
C.

The CollateralEstoppel Effect of Arbitration Decisions Generally

Another crucial issue which must be resolved before McMahon can be efficiently applied to securities disputes is the question
of what preclusive effect an arbitrator's findings of fact will have
ina simultaneous or subsequent judicial proceeding which seeks
to resolve the same factual issues. The mandatory severance and
arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims required by Byrd raises
the possibility that these arbitration findings of fact will have a
collateral estoppel effect on the simultaneous or subsequent litigation of federal claims.
Currently, the collateral estoppel effect of arbitration on the
litigation of federal securities claims is unclear because the
1 47
Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled on the issue.
Until the Byrd decision, courts and commentators seemed to assume without deciding that issues resolved in an arbitration pro48
ceeding were to be given full collateral estoppel effect in court.
Byrd muddied the water with regard to the collateral estoppel effect of arbitration awards, and courts forced to rule on the issue
49
since Byrd have gone both ways.'
Like arbitration, collateral estoppel, or " 'issue preclusion,'
is a device employed to promote efficiency in dispute resolution
142. Katsoris, supra note 6, at 8 & n.30; Pitt, 'Byrd'. First Step to Heighten Role
of Arbitration, Legal Times, Mar. 11, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
143. Some courts have taken this approach. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. Paine, Web:'
ber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., No. 81-5075 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 15, 1985) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file); Barr v. Illinois Co., No. 84 C 2076 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29,
1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
144. Katsoris, supra note 6, at 8.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 10 n.38.
147. Id., passim; see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223
(1985) ("The question of what preclusive effect, if any, the arbitration proceedings might have is not yet before us, however, and we do not decide it."); see also
infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
148. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 432 & n.256 and authorities cited therein;
see also infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
149. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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by simplifying the nature of the controversy. 50 The doctrine of
collateral estoppel prohibits a party who has had an issue actually
and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding from relitigating
the same issue in a subsequent action.151 It is based on the principle that such relitigation is unfair to the parties who have already
litigated the issue and wastes precious judicial resources. 52 In
order for collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of an issue, the
issue must be identical to the one already litigated, must have
been actually litigated by the parties in the earlier proceeding,
and the determination of the issue in the prior proceeding must
15 3
have been essential to the decision in that proceeding.
There are several major policy reasons typically offered in
favor of collateral estoppel. It prevents parties who have already
litigated their actions from being required to litigate them
again 1 54 and promotes judicial economy by disposing of an issue
on the basis of the prior litigation.15 5 Collateral estoppel also orders extra-judicial relationships by establishing finality of the litigation 15 6 and encouraging parties to act in accordance with the
prior decision. 157
In appropriate circumstances, collateral estoppel may also be
invoked by a stranger to the initial action to preclude relitigation
of an issue that was previously fully and fairly litigated by
others. 158 The availability of collateral estoppel formerly hinged
on the "mutuality doctrine," which prevented a party from using
a prior judgment as an estoppel against the other party unless
both parties were bound by the prior judgment. 15 9 This required
that the parties in the second proceeding be identical to or in
privity with those in the first proceeding. 160 In its 1979 Parklane
150. Mobilia, supra note 23, at 305 & 340; see also RESTATEMENT
JUDGMENTS

151.

(SECOND) OF

§ 27 (1982).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§§ 27-29 (1982); Ginger, The

Use of CollateralEstoppel in Private Civil RICO Actions, 54 TENN. L. REV. 31, 33 & n.4
(1986); Mobilia, supra note 23, at 305 & n.6.
152. Mobilia, supra note 23, at 312.
153. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 432 n.255; Ginger, supra note 151, at 33

& n.8; Mobilia, supra note 23, at 305-06 & n.7.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see also Mobilia,
supra note 23, at 321.
155. Mobilia, supra note 23, at 321 & n.103.
156. Id. at 321 & nn.104-06.
157. Id. at 321.
158. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979).
159. See Ginger, supra note 151, at 34 & n.ll; Mobilia, supra note 23, at 313

& nn.46-47.
160. See Ginger, supra note 151, at 34 & n.12; Note, Use of CollateralEstoppel
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Hosiery Co. v. Shore 161 decision, the Supreme Court of the United
States abolished this strict "mutuality of parties" rule as a prerequisite to the invocation of collateral estoppel. 162 In Parklane, the
Court liberalized the collateral estoppel doctrine by permitting a
plaintiff to preclude a defendant from relitigating an issue that
was decided in a prior suit between the same defendant and a
different plaintiff.' 6 3 Theoretically at least, a person not a party
to the previous proceeding could use the determination in that
16 4
proceeding to estop the relitigation of issues decided therein.
The principles enunciated in the Parklane decision are easily
applied to non-judicial contexts such as the arbitral arena.' 6 5
Collateral estoppel has the potential to promote efficiency when it
16 6
arises out of non-judicial proceedings, such as arbitration,
though the question whether it may be asserted based on an arbitration proceeding has seldom been directly addressed. 6 7 For
many years, courts held arbitration to be akin to a judicial inquiry,
carrying the same force as an adjudication and thereby precluding
relitigation of an issue in the same way as a judicial decision
would preclude its relitigation. 6 8 Courts and commentators
seemed to assume that issues decided in an arbitration proceed169
ing would be given full collateral estoppel effect in court.
Then the Supreme Court "cast a shadow of doubt over the matter"' 170 in its decision in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd.' 7 1 In
In Private Civil Actions Under RICO: The ProceduralBenefits of Parklane Hosiery Co.
Bigelow v. Old Dominion
v. Shore, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 490, 490 (1983); see, e.g.,
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912).
161. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
162. Id. at 326-28.
163. Id. at 326-33.
164. Cf Ginger, supra note 151, at 34.
165. See Mobilia, supra note 23, at 321.
166. Id. at 307, ("[T]o the extent that an identifiable issue is fully and fairly
resolved in a prior arbitration proceeding, the use of collateral estoppel in a
subsequent judicial proceeding is conceptually sound.").
167. See infra note 199.
168. Mobilia, supra note 23, at 310 & n.33; see also infra note 169.
169. See, e.g., Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 172 (D.C. Cir.
1981); City of Gainesville v. Island Creek Coal Sales Co., 618 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.
Fla. 1974); Sports Factory, Inc. v. Chanoff, 586 F. Supp. 342, 346 (E.D. Pa.
1984); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 567-68 (N.D. Cal. 1984);
Maidman v. O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25, 29-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Shapiro v.Jaslow,
320 F. Supp. 598, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Saphier Agency v. Green, 190 F. Supp.
713, 718-21 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 293 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1961); see also 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4475
(1981).
170. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 432.
171. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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Byrd, the Court referred to its previous rulings in the area of individual rights and held that employees represented by unions in
grievance arbitration need not fear issue preclusion when those
employees later sue in court under Section 1983 of Title VII of
172
the Civil Rights Act or under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
In these rulings, however, the Supreme Court had rejected
granting collateral estoppel effect to the previous arbitral findings
because of its "conclusion that Congress intended the statutes at
issue in those cases to be judicially enforceable and that arbitration could not provide an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings in adjudicating claims under those statutes."' 7 3 This
rationale clearly does not apply to securities law disputes involving RICO after McMahon, in which the Court concluded that Congress intended that the FAA apply to compel the arbitral
resolution of disputes under RICO and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, cast great doubt upon the vitality of the Wilko exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 from the FAA, and asserted that
"the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko
opinion in 1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time... [and] do[es] not hold
true today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC's oversight authority."174
While the Court referred to the previous collateral estoppel
rulings in its Byrd opinion," 7 5 it left open the possibility that collateral estoppel would make an arbitration proceeding one in
which nonarbitrable claims were effectively adjudicated, and ordered the arbitration to take place nonetheless." 7 6 The Court asserted that "the preclusive effect of arbitration proceedings is
significantly less well settled than the lower court opinions might
suggest," and that "arbitration proceedings will not necessarily
have a preclusive effect on subsequent federal-court proceedings."' 177 Moreover, the Court declined to decide the issue, stating that "[t]he question of what preclusive effect, if any, the
172. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (Section
1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair
Labor Standards Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
(Title VII); see also Byrd, 470 U.S. at 222-23.
173. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984).
174. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2341
(1987); see also supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
175. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221-24.
176. See id. at 223-24; Fletcher, supra note 32, at 433 & n.260; Ginger, supra
note 151, at 56 n.201.
177. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 222-23.
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arbitration proceedings might have is not yet before us... and we

do not decide

it."178

The Court did hint at what it thought was

the appropriate course to take, however, noting that "courts may
directly and effectively protect federal interests by determining
the preclusive effect to be given to an arbitration proceeding....
Suffice it to say that in framing preclusion rules in this context,
courts shall take into account the federal interests warranting
79
protection."
In ordering arbitration to take place despite the risk of preclusion,1 0 the Court apparently agreed with those courts that had
taken the position that the threat of collateral estoppel "does not
justify denying arbitration of otherwise arbitrable intertwined
state law claims."''
In his concurrence, Justice White made this
point explicitly, stating that fears of collateral estoppel should not
cause a district court to stay or refuse to compel the arbitration of
82
arbitrable claims.1
Cases decided after Byrd have re-examined the presumption
83
that collateral estoppel applies in the arbitration context.'
However, having rethought the issue, most courts (and commentators) have come down on the side of granting collateral estoppel effect to these arbitration decisions. For example, in a
thoughtful decision rendered shortly after Byrd, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled in Greenblatt v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. 184 that the application of collateral estoppel is within the sound discretion of the judge. 8 5 Though the
court cautioned that federal courts should be hesitant to give collateral estoppel effect to an arbitration decision if it would result
in the nonlitigation of claims that cannot be arbitrated,18 6 it nonetheless gave the arbitration proceeding full collateral estoppel effect in the case before it on the ground that arbitration had
resolved the issues that were crucial to the litigation of the nonar8 7
bitrable claims.1
The Greenblatt case involved a customer who sued his broker178. Id. at 223.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 223-24.
Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981).
Byrd, 470 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 433.
763 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1361.
Id.
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age firm over a margin account balance and was collaterally estopped from litigating his RICO claim due to a previous
arbitration award in the firm's favor.18 8 Greenblatt's account was
governed by an agreement containing an arbitration clause.' 8 9
When a decline in the stock market prompted a margin call and
he refused to pay, 190 an arbitration panel ruled in favor of Drexel
Burnham, finding that the brokerage firm was legally entitled to
the debit balance and all of the interest charged thereon. 19 1
Meanwhile, Greenblatt had filed a civil RICO action against
Drexel Burnham in federal district court after the arbitration proceedings were initiated, but before the arbitration hearing took
place. 19 2 After the arbitration panel ruled in its favor, Drexel
Burnham moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted its motion, finding that plaintiff was collaterally estopped
from litigating his RICO claim by the arbitrators' adverse determination of the facts underlying the claim.193 Plaintiff Greenblatt
appealed.
On appeal, the court held that collateral estoppel can properly result from determinations made during arbitration. The
court found that "[w]hen an arbitration proceeding affords basic
elements of adjudicatory procedure . . . . the determination of
issues in an arbitration proceeding should generally be treated as
conclusive in subsequent proceedings, just as determinations of a
court would be treated."' 94 The court found that the nature of
the RICO claim which had been asserted by Greenblatt favored
the application of collateral estoppel to the arbitration panel's
factfinding, and that the arbitration procedure had adequately
protected the rights of the parties. 19 5 As the court observed:
"[A] RICO claim is unusual in that it must be based on underlying, independently unlawful acts. We do not think it improper to
grant collateral estoppel effect to an arbitration panel's factual
findings regarding these underlying acts, particularly if such findings are within the panel's authority and expertise."' 196 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit held that Greenblatt was collaterally
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See Ginger, supra note 151, at nn.192-201 and accompanying text.
Greenblatt, 763 F.2d at 1354.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1361.
Id.
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estopped by the arbitration panel's prior findings of fact from litigating or proving any of the predicate acts necessary to support a
RICO violation. The court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Drexel Burnham on the RICO

claim. 197
Most instructive, however, is the Greenblatt court's discussion
of the Supreme Court decisions in Byrd and McDonald and what
these decisions mean to courts trying to decide whether to give
collateral estoppel effect to arbitral decisions. The Eleventh Circuit asserted that,
[t]he Byrd and McDonald cases indicate that, at least with
respect to an important, nonarbitrable federal claim, a
federal court should be hesitant to preclude the litigation of the federal claim based on the collateral estoppel
effects of a prior arbitration award. These cases indicate
a case-by-case approach to determining the collateral estoppel effects of arbitration on federal claims, focusing
on the federal interests in insuring a federal court determination of the federal claim, the expertise of the arbitrator and his scope of authority under the arbitration
agreement, and the procedural adequacy of the arbitration proceeding.19
The Greenblatt decision represents a sensible approach to the
problem of the proper collateral estoppel effect to be given to
arbitration awards. Collateral estoppel is a common-law doctrine
and as such must undergo judicial modification and qualification
over time to meet changing circumstances. It should not be construed to be so inflexible as to flout the will of Congress that certain claims must receive a judicial hearing. It is also reasonable,
however, to leave open the possibility that a collateral estoppel
effect should be given to arbitration decisions when, as in Greenblatt, the court determines that the issues received a fair and complete hearing in the arbitration proceeding and that litigation in
federal court would simply be a waste of time and resources for
all concerned. 199 In fact, several cases decided after Byrd and
Greenblatt have followed Greenblattand held that a previous arbitration decision has collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent federal
197. Id. at 1362.
198. Id. at 1361. See also, Comment, supra note 120, at 353-54 n.101.
199. See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 434.
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judicial proceeding. 20 0
One problem unique to the issue of granting collateral estoppel effect to arbitration decisions must be addressed at this point:
most arbitration awards do not make separate and clear findings
as to each issue of fact. 2 0 ' This means that a subsequent court
trying to give collateral estoppel effect to the arbitration award
cannot be sure which specific issues were addressed and decided
by the arbitrator.2 0 2 In single-issue disputes, the problem is less
likely to occur because a discussion or explanation of the award is
generally unnecessary to identify the issue and the outcome.
When the arbitration proceeding covers several issues, it may be
more difficult to give a particular issue collateral estoppel effect
because the arbitrator usually does not deliver an opinion as to
each issue being contested in the dispute. 20 3 Moreover, even
when identical claims are at stake, there is often no clear decision
on a disputed issue. 20 4 This has caused at least one commentator
to argue that the usefulness of collateral estoppel in the arbitration context may thus be limited to cases where a single issue is
submitted to arbitration and that same issue arises in a later
20 5
action.
However, this problem can successfully be resolved simply by
requiring that arbitrators make separate and specific findings of
fact as to each factual issue presented, and by placing the burden
onthe party seeking estoppel to establish that the particular is200. See, e.g., Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807
F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1986); J.D. Marshall Int'l, Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 656 F. Supp.
830 (N.D. Ill. 1987); O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 654
F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Timberlake v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., [1985-86
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,336 (Sept. 4, 1985) (Arbitrator's
single-sentence findings were too ambiguous to be given collateral estoppel effect). See also 1 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 4 (Mar. 5, 1986). At least one
court has even ruled that the failure to raise a matter as a defense during an
arbitration proceeding forecloses the party from raising the matter in a later
judicial proceeding on the ground that to permit the party to later raise the
claim would serve to undermine the arbitration award. Rudell v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 802 F.2d 926, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1986). But see Katsoris,
supra note 6, at 9 ("[i]t is somewhat doubtful that a prior arbitration award would
have a preclusive effect upon subsequent litigation of a federal securities
claim."); Brown, supra note 37, at 28 ("The [Supreme] Court has expressed
doubt regarding the collateral estoppel effects of arbitration in subsequent litigation involving statutory rights .... ").
201. See Mobilia, supra note 23, at 309 & n.28; see also Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
202. Mobilia, supra note 23, at 323.
203. Id. at 323 & n. 117.
204. Id. at 323 & n.120.
205. Id. at 324.
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sues involved in the arbitration were each specifically and finally
20 6
decided and are identical to issues arising in the litigation.
D. The Collateral Estoppel Effect of the Arbitration of RICO Claims in
the Subsequent Litigation of Related Securities Law Claims
The preclusive effect to be given a previous arbitration award
is a particularly significant issue in the context of securities litigation where RICO claims are coupled with nonarbitrable securities
claims arising under the 1933 Act. Now that RICO claims are
subject to compelled arbitration under McMahon, a court might
choose to stay its own consideration of a related securities claim
pending arbitration of the RICO claim. If the arbitration decision
is then given preclusive effect by the court, an adverse decision on
the RICO claim may significantly affect a plaintiff's nonarbitrable
20 7
securities law claims.
The crucial question concerning the arbitration of RICO
claims which are based on both arbitrable and nonarbitrable securities offenses is whether the arbitration precludes a later in20 8
dependent resolution of the nonarbitrable claims by a court.
With reference to nonarbitrable federal securities law claims in
particular, the statutory nonwaiver provision of the 1933 Act
which so concerned the Supreme Court in Wilko is offended only
if prior arbitration of the RICO claim results in the foreclosure of
the customer's right to bring an action in court under the 1933
9
Act. 20
However, such foreclosure is unlikely. RICO is a complex
statute requiring proof of more than predicate offenses to establish liability. Plaintiffs must also show a "pattern of racketeering
activity" and the existence of an "enterprise" in order to recover. 2 10 Failure to prove either of these prerequisites results in
judgment for the defendant. Because arbitration awards typically
do not involve detailed findings on particular issues or opinions
regarding liability on specific claims, 2 1' a decision for the defendant in a RICO arbitration simply indicates that the plaintiff failed
to establish liability under RICO and says nothing about the via212
bility of the predicate offenses as independent claims.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 323.
See 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 39, Part 2, at 1 (Mar. 17, 1987).
Brown, supra note 37, at 27.
Id. at 27-28.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
In fact, in a very recent case alleging facts similar to those alleged in
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Therefore, because findings regarding predicate offenses are
not necessary to a judgment for the defendant in a RICO arbitration, collateral estoppel would not bar later adjudication of the
claims stemming from these predicate acts. If the plaintiff loses a
RICO arbitration, collateral estoppel will not apply to the predicate offenses. If the plaintiff wins the RICO arbitration, collateral
estoppel will not harm, and might even help, the plaintiff in a sub21 3
sequent action.
Moreover, even if conventional preclusion analysis would put
a nonarbitrable claim at risk after a RICO arbitration, the
Supreme Court has observed that federal courts have it within
21 4
their power to protect nonarbitrable federal statutory rights.
The Court noted that it is possible to do this in the context of
giving some collateral estoppel effect to arbitration proceedings,
pointing out that
courts may directly and effectively protect federal interests by determining the preclusive effect to be given to
an arbitration proceeding. . . . Suffice it to say that in
framing preclusion rules in this context, courts shall take
into account the federal interests warranting protection.
As a result, there is no reason to require that district
courts decline to compel arbitration, or manipulate the
ordering of the resulting bifurcated proceedings, simply
2 15
to avoid an infringement of federal interests.
Thus, the most sensible solution to the problem seems to be
to fashion a general rule that arbitration awards shall be given
collateral estoppel effect in related litigation of securities law disMcMahon, an investor's claim that his broker engaged in "churning" in that he
made numerous excessive trades in the investor's account was held to allege
only one " 'racketeering activity' " for purposes of RICO on the ground that
such " 'churning' " is a "unified offense" rather than the requisite " 'pattern of
racketeering activity' " required for RICO liability. Winer v. Patterson, 663 F.
Supp. 723, 723-24 (1987). Therefore, the court ruled for the defendant and
dismissed the RICO count from the suit while letting stand the securities and
wire fraud allegations. Id. at 726. Thus, it is clear that a court's judgment that
the plaintiff failed to establish the liability of the defendant under RICO says
nothing about the viability of the predicate offense, here churning, as an independent claim.
213. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Brown, supra
note 37, at 28 & n.82; Ginger, supra note 151 passim. For further discussion of
collateral estoppel in this context see supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
214. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985); Brown,
supra note 37, at 28 & n.83. For further discusssion of these federal interests see
supra note 179 and accompanying text.
215. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 223.
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putes, no matter whether the arbitral findings concern RICO
claims or other arbitrable pendent claims. The district courts
should deny preclusive effect to arbitration awards only in situations where such denial is necessary to protect the federal interests at stake.
E.

CollateralEstoppel and the Problem of Ordering

Giving collateral estoppel effect to arbitration decisions can
maximize judicial economy and minimize potential inefficiency
and duplication of effort. The use of collateral estoppel in this
context can simplify or even make unnecessary the judicial resolution of related issues. In the words of one court:
[f]ederal courts, through the judicious use of collateral
estoppel, can preserve the effectiveness of arbitration; by
giving the arbitration decision some preclusive effect in
the federal action, the arbitrator's fact-finding efforts are
not needlessly duplicated. At the same time, the federal
court's review of the arbitration hearing and decision-a
review that must be undertaken to determine if the circumstances of the case warrant the application of collateral estoppel-ensures the investor's legislativelycreated right to a federal forum for his securities
2 16
claim.
Several other courts seeking to manage the resolution of securities disputes involving both arbitrable and nonarbitrable pendent claims have noted that "[t]he results of the arbitration
proceedings may simplify or even resolve the proceedings [in the
district court]," 2 17 in that the arbitral decision could make unnecessary any further district court action, be given evidentiary
weight in any district court action, or simplify the issues remain2 8
ing to be litigated. i
Therefore, though Byrd and McMahon tell us that arbitration
is not to be denied due to concerns about judicial economy, these
concerns do argue strongly against letting the arbitration and the
216. O'Neill v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 654 F. Supp.
347, 351 (N.D. 11. 1987).
217. J.D. Marshall Int'l, Inc., v. Redstart, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 830, 834 (N.D.
Ill. 1987).
218. Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 20
(1st Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). See also Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp.
561, 567-68 (N.D. Cal. 1984).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 2
548

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33: p. 515

judicial proceeding go forward simultaneously.2 19 Such simultaneous bifurcated proceedings would cause many problems, including "annoying issues of adjournment and/or harassment due
to the fact that discovery and depositions in the litigation are being conducted at the same time as the arbitration proceeding
[and] [c]omplicated issues of collateral estoppel and res judicata
....
"220 In addition, differences in evidence, procedure, and substantive law between arbitration and litigation could easily cause
different findings of fact and conflicting and contradictory ulti22
mate results. '
That being the case, some commentators have argued that
"the only reasonable solution to the problem of ordering is to
stay the judicial resolution of nonarbitrable claims pending the
outcome of the arbitration proceeding."2 2 2 This is what most
courts that have faced the issue since Byrd have done. 2 23 This solution to the problem of ordering may well be "an ideal one,
given the competing interests at stake." 2 24 On the one hand, requiring the parties both to arbitrate and to litigate is worse than
requiring them to litigate all their claims because it destroys all
the advantages of arbitration. The parties are not spared the expense of litigation, the court docket is not any less crowded, and
the time involved is even greater. "In other words, to require the
parties simultaneously to litigate and to arbitrate robs the parties
2 25
of the benefit of the bargain they made."
On the other hand, staying the court proceeding pending the
completion of arbitration prevents the plaintiff and defendant
219. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 434.
220. Katsoris, supra note 6, at 9.
221. Id. at 11.
222. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 434-35. See also Brief for Appellants at 2326; Girard v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1986).
223. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 435 & n.271. See also, Sevinor v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1986); Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983);
J.D. Marshall Int'l, Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 830, 833-34 (N.D. Ill.
1987); Becker v. Silverman, 638 F. Supp. 193, 196-97, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Bale
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 650, 655 (D. Minn. 1986); Webb v.
R. Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1123, 1124 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Mullis v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1358-61 (D. Nev. 1980);
Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-86 Transfer Binder]

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,328, at 92,175 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 1985). But see
Cummings v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 132, 133 (M.D. La. 1986)
(refusing to stay federal action pending arbitration of state claims). See also
supra note 125 and accompanying text.
224. Fletcher, supra note 32, at 435.
225. Id.
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from having to be in two places at once. It also makes a settlement short of federal litigation more likely because a party may
rethink his stance in light of an impartial arbitrator's view of the
case. In addition, courts need not be concerned about the collateral estoppel effect of the arbitration on the stayed judicial proceeding, because application of that doctrine is within their
discretion. Thus, "sever and stay" seem to some an ideal solution
22 6
to the problem of ordering.
Other commentators, however, advocate the consolidation of
all securities-related claims in a single proceeding, 22 7 preferably
in an arbitration forum. 22 8 From the standpoint of pure efficiency, arbitration of both federal and state claims in a single proceeding is probably the best method of dispute resolution.2 2 9
However, when nonarbitrable securities claims are joined with arbitrable securities or RICO claims, Byrd seems to require simultaneous arbitration and litigation. Therefore, even the simplest
customer complaint could well result in multiforum and/or dupli2 30
cative litigation.
Because disputes between investors and brokers arise frequently but often involve modest sums, a uniform and efficient
alternative to the present system of resolving securities claims is
desirable. Instead of handling the problem of resolving these disputes by ordering immediate arbitration and staying litigation of
the nonarbitrable claims until after the arbitration concludes, perhaps all securities-related claims should be consolidated in an ar231
bitration proceeding in the first place.
F. Recommendations
Congress and the SEC should join the debate on securities
arbitration and work together toward the goal of creating a unified and economical system of arbitration which promotes the
2 32
policies underlying the securities laws.
It has been said that "it is not merely of some importance but
is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Comment, supra note 120, at 354.
Brown, supra note 37, at 33; Shell, supra note 4.
See Comment, supra note 120, at 354 & n.105.
Brown, supra note 37, at 33.
Id.
Id. at 33-34.
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done." 23 3 Therefore, if all securities disputes are to be resolved

in the arbitration forum, arbitration procedures must be fair both
in fact and in appearance. 23 4 The process must inspire public
confidence if it is to be entrusted with important federal statutory
rights. 235 To this end, prompt legislative and regulatory action is
needed to establish an effective and unified securities arbitration
system. 236
23 7
First of all, Congress should overturn the Wilko exemption
and make all securities claims subject to voluntary, contractual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act,238 perhaps even in a
specialized independent forum governed by a separate organization in which the public participates. 239 Congress and the SEC
should then devise uniform arbitration procedures and practices
for use in the securities industry which eliminate adhesion contracts and conflicts of interest on the part of arbitrators, and
which ensure that arbitrators will faithfully apply the securities
laws.

240

These objectives can be accomplished by requiring that all
securities arbitrations be conducted pursuant to an amended Uniform Code of Arbitration under the jurisdiction of the SEC, and
by a specific delegation of rulemaking authority by Congress to
24
the SEC that explicitly states these goals. '
Next, the SEC should conduct a thorough review of current
practices used in securities arbitrations, including the Uniform
Code of Arbitration, and formulate an amended version of the
Code. At a minimum, this amended Code should guarantee "free
choice" to investors who do not wish to sign "take it or leave it"
arbitration clauses 242 and inform those who do sign that all disputes will be settled by arbitration for reasons of economy. Investors should be told that they are not required to consent to
233. King v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259.
234. Katsoris, supra note 6, at 3, 14 & nn.58-59.
235. See Shell, supra note 4.
236. Id.
237. The legislative abolition of the Wilko exemption is advocated by several commentators. See Brown, supra note 37, at 34; Fletcher, supra note 32, at
459; Shell, supra note 4.
238. See Brown, supra note 37, at 34; Katsoris, supra note 6, at 14 & nn.6064; Shell, supra note 4.
239. See Katsoris, supra note 6, at 14 &.nn.60-64; Katsoris, supra note 33, at
306 & n.206, 312-13 & nn.259-63.
240. Brown, supra note 37, at 34.
241. Id.
242. Shell, supra note 4.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss3/2

36

Ginger: Managing Securities Disputes after McMahon: A Call for Consolidat

19881

MANAGING SECURITIES DISPUTES

arbitration in order to do business with the broker or exchange,
and they should sign separately any arbitration clauses to which
24 3
they do consent.
In addition, the arbitration clause itself should warn investors
that by signing the clause, they are giving up their rights to jury
trial and to judicial review of the arbitrator's decision. 24 4 Arbitrators should be drawn from outside the securities industry, 245 and
the Code's term "public arbitrator" should be redefined to exclude lawyers and others who work for firms that serve the securities industry as advisers. 2 46 Also, to the extent possible, the
Uniform Code of Arbitration should be amended to give customers a role in selecting their arbitrators, and information regarding
the dispositions of securities arbitrations in which each arbitrator
has participated in the past should be made available to both
24 7
sides prior to the selection process.
Finally, the Code should explicitly state that arbitrators are to
follow federal securities law in rendering their decisions, and the
arbitrators should be required to sign an affidavit to this effect
which is to accompany their final decision. 248 This affidavit
should list the federal statutory rights, if any, that were raised,
considered, and decided by the arbitrator, which side won with
respect to each statutory claim, and should state that, to the best
of his or her ability, the arbitrator followed the law regarding
2 49
these claims.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The number of legal claims made against brokers by disgruntled customers is on the rise, as is the number of complaints
about brokers filed with the SEC.2 50 In addition, these customers
243. Brown, supra note 37, at 35.
244. Id. at 35 & n.93.
245. Id. at 35 & n.94.
246. Shell, supra note 4.
247. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 37, at 35-36 & n.95.
248. Shell, supra note 4.
249. Brown, supra note 37, at 36.
250. Ingersoll, Sleepy Watchdogs: Regulation of Brokers by. Securities Indusby
Seems To Be Faltering,Wall St. J., July 21, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest ed.) ("More
and more disgruntled customers are suing wayward brokers or filing arbitration
cases with stock exchanges. And in record numbers, they are complaining to the
SEC. The agency received 10,392 complaints last year, up 121% from 1982.
The National Association of Securities Dealers recorded a startling 171% increase. The biggest surge in complaints to the SEC involves unauthorized trading, high-pressure sales pitches and 'churning'-excessive trading in customer
accounts to generate commissions.").
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have become increasingly aggressive in their use of federal statutes, including RICO, to sue brokers and dealers. 2 5 1 It is by no
means clear that RICO's drafters intended that RICO should apply to securities disputes. Nonetheless, about forty percent of all
RICO cases are brought against brokers who have no connection
with racketeering.2 52 Because brokers could be required to pay
treble damages under RICO, they are more in favor than ever of
253
arbitration of customer claims.
Now that McMahon has made RICO claims as well as the majority of federal securities claims brought against brokers by the
public arbitrable, more securities-fraud disputes will be forced
into arbitration, while the number of court battles in this area is
sure to decrease dramatically. While the courts, Congress, and
the SEC could seek to streamline this process by mandating the
"sever and stay" approach and by granting collateral estoppel
effect to arbitrators' findings in subsequent court contests, the consolidation of all securities-related claims in the arbitration forum
is a more efficient way to resolve securities disputes.
It is clear that the securities industry needs some alternative
to formal litigation, and that the present system of industry-sponsored arbitration of investors' claims is both practical and economical. Statistics from the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration show that most cases are disposed of the same year
they are filed, that roughly half of all customers who arbitrate
their securities complaints are awarded damages, and that the
awards equal about half the amount requested. 2 54
However fair the present system may be, several legislative
and regulatory reforms are necessary before a truly effective and
unified securities arbitration system will exist which can serve as
the court of last resort for important federal statutory rights.
Congress should require that all securities claims be settled by
voluntary contractual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration
Act, and then, in cooperation with the SEC, take steps to assure
that the arbitration practices and procedures used are uniform
and adequately protective of both investors and the federal interest in the effective enforcement of the securities laws.
Any RICO claims included in securities disputes should be
required to be arbitrated as well, preferably in conjunction with
251.
252.
253.
254.

See Shell, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the securities-law claims themselves. If for some reason the
RICO claims are arbitrated in a separate proceeding, the arbitration decision on the RICO matters should be given full collateral
estoppel effect by the arbitrators handling the securities-law
claims.
This consolidation of securities disputes in the arbitral forum
is beneficial to both investors and brokers. 25 5 The parties can
avoid crowded court dockets and expect a resolution of their dispute in, on the average, four to six months. 2 56 Arbitration is also
much cheaper than litigation-usually about one-third the cost,
even if both parties are represented by attorneys. 25 7 Thus, small
claims that an investor might choose not to assert in court due to
the expense of litigation are more likely be pursued in arbitration.2 58 Obviously, the resulting likelihood that an increased
number of securities claims will be redressed inures to the benefit
of society as well. Therefore, Congress and the SEC should take
advantage of the opening provided by the Supreme Court of the
United States in McMahon and see to it that all securities disputes
are resolved in their entirety in the arbitral forum.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 458 & nn.421-24.
See Meyerowitz, supra note 28, at 80.
Id.
See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 458.
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